l Introduction* Blackwell [1] has introduced the concept of approachability in obtaining an analog of the von Neumann minimax theorem for games with vector payoffs. This paper continues the study of this concept. Games with vector payoffs are again two person decision problems with each player having r and s pure strategies respectively but the element of the payoff matrix corresponding to the (i,j) strategy pair is a point g(i, j) in Euclidean jV-space. Let C G denote the convex hull of the rs points g (i, j) . Then the problem studied in approachability theory can be stated briefly as follows. If a game with vector payoffs is repeated in time can player I force the average payoff to approach a preassigned closed subset S of C G with probability approaching 1 as the number of plays becomes infinite?
Because a sequence of games is being considered the rules of play must specify to what extent a player's decision at any stage may depend on past plays. This leads to the natural question of how the class of approachable sets depends on the type of information available to player I. It is specifically this question that is considered in this paper. The problem is formulated mere precisely below. Let be an r x s matrix each element of which is a point in Euclidean JV-space and let -||e (tlJ) , fc | denote an rsxt matrix such that 0 ^ e iiJ)yJc (for all 1 ίg i ^ r, 1 ^ j ^ s, 1 <; k ^ t) and Σ»-i e (*,j>»* = 1 (for all 1 ^ i S r, 1 ^ j <£ s). A pair (G, ^') will determine a game as follows. By a strategy for player I is meant a sequence / = {/" : n = 0,1, 2, •} of functions where /", for n = 1, 2, ••, is a mapping from the set of n -tuples (a 19 a 2 , ..., αj, a t e {1, 2, ••-,«}, to the set P = { (p 19 , p r )\l S p i9 Σί Pi = 1}, and / 0 is a point in P. A strategy for player II is a sequence of vectors h = {/^ : n = 0,1, 2, •} where h n e Q = {(q lf . , g s )|0 ^ g, , Σί
. The interpretation of the play of the game (G, ^) is that player I selects a number, say i 19 from {1, « ,r} according to the mixed strategy f 0 and player II selects a number, say JΊ, from {1, * ,s} according to the strategy h 0 . The pair (i ly j\) is observed by a referee who employs the distribution {e (tlJl)1 , ", e {ilJl) , t } to choose a number, denoted a 19 from {1, •••,£}. The number a 1 is precisely the information told to player I at the conclusion of the first play of the game and he then chooses i 2 by means of the mixed strategy /i(Gi) while player II chooses j 2 with strategy h τ . The referee selects α 2 according to {e ihth ) n , , e ihJi ), t } and α 2 is told to player I who now employs a third mixed strategy f 2 (d lt a 2 ) to choose i 3 , etc. Thus a pair (G, <J^) together with a fixed pair of strategies (/, h) defines a vectorvalued stochastic process {Y n : n = 1, 2, •} with {g {i j } : % = 1, 2, •} being a realization of the process for a particular play of the game.
Let C G denote the convex hull of the rs points g{i, j) and let S denote any closed set in C G . S is said to be approachable with /* in (G, ^") if for every h P{lim S n = 0} = 1 n where S n denotes the distance of the point Σ? YJn from S and {Y 4 : i = 1, 2, •••} is the vector-valued process determined by /* and h.
In § 2 necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for a set to be approachable when player I obtains no information concerning IΓs choices. In § 3 sufficient conditions for approachability are given in the case when I knows nothing of his own past but is completely informed of IΓs past history. For convex S the condition is both necessary and sufficient. Section 4 contains necessary and sufficient conditions for the approachability of convex S in the case that the rank of ^y is equal to rs.
2. No information relevant to player II. It is clear that the minimal class of approachable sets is obtained when the rank of ^y is one (the case of no information) and the result of this section is that this class is made no larger if player I receives information concering only his own past play.
For any p e P denote by R(p) the convex hull of the s points Σt Pi9t,j' It is an immediate consequence of the Strong Law of Large Numbers that R(p) is approachable with the strategy f*={f n =p: n -0 f 1, •••} and thus approachable in the case of rank (^) = 1. The theorem of this section is that the collection of R(p)'s is essentially the totality to approachable sets when nothing is known concerning player IΓs past play. Proof. The sufficiency is an immediate consequence of the Strong Law of Large Numbers.
To prove the necessity of the condition suppose that S is approachable. Let /° denote a strategy for player I with which S is approachable. The strategy /° induces a vector-valued stochastic process {X n = (X ln , . It is worthwhile to note that this theorem remains true if player IΓs class of strategies is restricted to strategies which are sequences of pure strategies, that is, if h = {h n : n = 0,1, 2, •,} is a strategy for II, then all components of h n are zero with a single exception which is one. This restricted class of straregies for player II is essentially the smallest class for which the theorem remains true.
3 Complete information about player II. If player I is informed of the complete past history of player IΓs choice but receives no information concerning his own past play the class of approachable sets is greatly increased. 
iu,v) k = 0 /or all u Φ i and all v and j. Then a closed set S is approachable if for every x 0 S, x e Cfl, ί&ere e&ΐsts p e P such that the plane through y, the closest point in S to x, perpendicular to the line segment xy separates x from R(p).
Proof. Let S be an arbitrary closed set satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem. The proof consists in exhibiting a strategy /* for player I with which S is approachable. By hypothesis if x $ S there exists at least one p e P such that x is separated from R(p); thus player I can associate a unique ' 'separating p" to each x, say p(x). Further, because of the structure of ^ the sequences {a n : n = 1, 2, •} and {j n : n = 1, 2, •} may be identified and f$ (j 19 ,j n ) will be written for f*(a lf •••, a n ).
The strategy /* for player I is now defined as follows :
where z k = Σί-i/£-i,ί Λ^ and /ίOΊ» » i*) = (/ί,i> "»ftr)k = O> 1» To contruct /ί(ii, , i n ) player 1 has as information (i 1? , y n ) and thus since a unique p(x) has been associated to every x $ S it is possible for player I to reconstruct /<f, ••-,/*_! and hence this strategy is well defined.
Let {Y n == (F Λi i, , Y n , N ) n = 1, 2, •} be the vector process generated by /* and some arbitrary strategy h for player II. Then as mentioned previously h generates a stochastic process {W n : n = 1, 2, •}. Denote by w = (w^ w 2 , * -•) an arbitrary sample sequence of this process. The proof will be completed if it is shown that P{lim w d{ljn Σ" Y*, S) = 0\w} =1 for arbitrary w. Now note that for fixed w the random variables Y n>lc and Y mtΊ& are stochastically independent for nψm and A; = 1, 2, •••, JV with mean values z n>1c and ^m fc respectively. Thus, it is an immediate consequence of the Strong Law of Large Numbers that it is sufficient to prove that lim d(z n , S) = 0 to complete the proof of the theorem.
Suppose z n $ S and let u n denote the point in S closest to z n . Then (u n -z n , z n+1 ) ^ (u n -z n , u n ) and if S n = d\z n , S) > 0 it follows that However, z n+1 -z n = (z n+1 -zj/n and thus,
Further, \z n+2 -z n \ 2 S Aj(n + 1)\ where A is some constant, and thus if S n _ ± > 0 it follows that
c) |δ n -S n^\ ^ Ό\n where B and D are constants. However, if {8 n : n = 1, 2, •} is a sequence of real numbers satisfying (a), (b), and (c) it is quite easy to prove that lim n 8 n = 0. Thus the proof is complete.
THEOREM 3. Let T(q), q e Q, denote the convex hull of the r points Σ S j=iQj9ij Let ^ satisfy the same conditions as in Theorem 2. Then a closed cenvex set S is approachable if and only if it intersects every T(q).
The proof of this theorem is given in [1] and will be omitted.
4 rank (^) = rs. The theorem of this section was obtained in [1] for the case of ^ equal to the identity matrix.
THEOREM 4. Suppose rank (^') = rs, then a closed convex set S is approachable if and only if it intersects every T(q).
Proof. The necessity is clear. If S Π T(q 0 ) is empty player II chooses h° = {K Ξ= q 0 : n = 0, 1, •} and it is clear that P{lim w d(l/n ΣΛ Yic,T(q 0 )) = 0} = 1 where {Y k : k = 1, 2, •} is generated by h° and any arbitrary strategy for player I. Thus since S Π T(q 0 ) is empty S is not approachable.
Conversely let S be an arbitrary closed convex subset of C o satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem. Define the r x s matrix L = \\1 %J 
where T z (g) is the convex hull of the r points Σ5-I9J^J Further, it follows after some simple computations that if S L is approachable in (L, ^) then S is approachable in (G, ^) and in fact approachable with the same strategy. Thus to complete the proof of the theorem one need only show that every closed convex subset of C L is approachable in (L, ,.> ZΓ ) if it intersects T L (q) for all q e Q. Let S be an arbitrary closed convex subset of C L and suppose S Π T L (q) is nonempty for all q e Q. Further, suppose t = rs this can be done with no loss of generality. Define the matrix U = ||β (U) || (1 <: i <Ξ r, 1 ^ i ^ s) where e (U) denotes the probability distribution over E rs choosing l u with probability e (lJ) denote a strategy for player I with which S' is approachable; the proof will be completed by showing that S is approachable with /°.
Let h denote a strategy for player II. Let {Y n : n = 1, 2, •} be the vector-valued process generated by (/°, fe) in L' and let {U n : w = 1, 2, •••} be the process generated by (/°, h) in L. It remains to show that P{lim n d(U n , S)}=1. First note that d(U n , S) £ d(CΓ n , C^7")" 
